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Abstract 
English-speaking South Africans are marked by multiple identities, but until recently they were united by strong 
feelings of Britishness and loyalty to the Crown, symbolized by the fervent flying of the Union Jack. This study 
analyzes the nature of the “English” community which settled in the Transvaal after Britain annexed the Boer 
Republic in 1877, and investigates its response when the British government restored Transvaal independence after 
the Boer uprising (the First Anglo-Boer War) of 1880-1. Since the security and prosperity of the Transvaal English 
depended upon maintenance of British rule, the alternative to fashioning a new colonial identity was to assert 
Britishness through an exaggerated loyalty to Crown and flag. “Loyal” inhabitants either fled the Transvaal during the 
Boer rebellion or took refuge in beleaguered towns. During the subsequent negotiations, the loyalists concluded that 
the Gladstone administration was sacrificing their interests, and organized to protest their allegiance and to claim 
compensation for losses. When the Pretoria Convention was nevertheless signed in August 1881, loyalists publicly 
buried the Union Jack — the very symbol of their British identity — to express their sense of outraged betrayal. 
 
 
In the last days of 1880, a young H. Rider Haggard, his wife, and their servants landed in South 
Africa to visit his farm “Hilldrop,” bought in 1879, near the little town of Newcastle in the 
northern apex of the British colony of Natal. It was an unfortunate moment. Not only did 
Haggard’s arrival coincide with the beginning of the Boer uprising in the Transvaal Territory 
against British rule, but his destination was uncomfortably close to the theatre of operations. A 
force headed by the High Commissioner for South-East Africa, Major-General Sir George 
Pomeroy Colley, was preparing to batter its way through Boer-held passes in northern Natal 
into the rebellious colony to relieve the besieged small and scattered garrisons of British troops. 
Sheltering behind makeshift fortified positions were loyalist civilians — those, that is, who were 
not already making their way out of the Transvaal towards the security of Natal, or the 
sympathetically-neutral Boer republic of the Orange Free State.  
 Haggard had a particular interest in the Transvaal. He had first entered the territory in April 
1877 on the staff of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, whom Lord Carnarvon, the British Secretary of 
State for the Colonies in Disraeli’s second administration, had appointed Special Commissioner 
with the task of annexing the South African Republic to the Crown. The annexation of the Boer 
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republic was as a key element in implementing the Conservative government’s policy of 
confederating all the white-ruled states of southern Africa under British rule. The Conservatives 
held that the imperial consolidation of the sub-continent would better enable it to fulfill its 
imperial strategic role, at the same time providing a settled environment for greater economic 
integration and progress.1 On 24 May 1877, Haggard himself had run up the Union Jack in 
Pretoria, the capital of what was henceforth to be called the Transvaal Territory. He later 
described this action as ”one of the proudest moments” of his life. However, as he later ruefully 
admitted, if he had known that on 2 August 1881 the same flag would be “shamefully and 
dishonourably torn down and buried” by a large crowd of British loyalists enraged at the terms 
of the Convention which effectively restored Pretoria to Boer rule, “it would have been one of 
the most miserable.”2 
 Haggard was one of those who had absolutely no doubts as to the benefits of British 
annexation accruing to the bankrupt South African Republic, and would write in 1882 of its 
“perfectly magical” effects: “Credit and commerce were at once restored; the railway bonds that 
were down to nothing in Holland rose with one bound to par, and the value of landed property 
nearly doubled.”3 But it was not merely the act of annexation which effected the conjuring trick, 
but its influence in attracting hard-working and enterprising emigrants, mainly of British stock, 
to invest, live, and prosper in the new Transvaal Colony. Haggard insisted these people were 
not mere adventurers, but were intensely conscious of being British: 
 
People in England seem to fancy that when men go to the colonies they lose all 
sense of pride in their country, and think of nothing but their own advantage. I 
do not think this is the case; indeed, I believe that, individual for individual, 
there exists a greater sense of loyalty, and a deeper pride in their nationality, and 
in the proud name of England, among colonists, than among Englishmen proper. 
Certainly, the humiliation of the Transvaal surrender was more keenly felt in 
South Africa than it was at home.4 
 
 Echoing Haggard over a century later, in 1999, Marjory Harper drew attention to the way in 
which late nineteenth-century dismissive views of the overriding self-interest of British 
migrants jostled with portrayals of settlers’ “umbilical attachment to their flag.”5 Such 
dichotomous perceptions feed into current examinations of the cultures of imperialism. In 
particular, they are relevant to the way in which colonizers attempted to construct new cultures 
through which they defined themselves and others.6 “Culture,” Andrew Porter has usefully 
suggested, means for historians of empire “the ideas, values, social habits and institutions 
which were felt to distinguish the British and their colonial subjects from each other, and which 
gave to both their sense of identity, purpose and achievement.”7 Certainly for John Mackenzie, 
the possession of empire helped forge a sense of distinct “Britishness” and a popular imperial 
culture which was a “potent mixture,” among other ingredients, of patriotism, the military 
virtues, reverence for the monarchy and “a self-referencing approach to other peoples.”8 
Naturally, the latter led to a sense of racial superiority and concomitant belief in the right to rule 
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which, from the mid-nineteenth century, was taken increasingly for granted across the British 
Empire, and endowed it with its distinct identity.9 
 Until very recently, little historiographical attention has been paid to the evolution of an 
English-speaking identity in South Africa comparable to the work being undertaken in other 
Commonwealth countries, notably in Britain and Australia. What pioneering research has been 
undertaken, by John Lambert and others, shows that English-speaking South Africans have 
always been marked by multiple identities but, until the advent of the Republic in 1961, they 
were united by strong feelings of Britishness and loyalty to the Crown, symbolized by the 
fervent flying of the Union Jack.10 This is not to deny that in the South African colonies of the 
Cape and Natal, in common with other British colonies of white settlement in Australasia and 
North America, passionate Britishness was combined by the 1870s (without much 
acknowledgment of contradiction) with an increasing desire for greater constitutional and 
economic independence.11 Yet, British settlers in South Africa were akin to the mid-nineteenth 
century Tories of Upper Canada: their sense of attachment to the Empire was still primarily 
expressed in terms of loyalty to the parent, or projection of Britain, rather than to a specific 
place; the loyalist tradition embodied the preservation and continuation of British cultural 
norms and practices in an alien environment. The basic settler assumption was that in return for 
such loyalty, they could always depend upon Britain to protect them against those who would 
overthrow the British way of life in the colonies.12 
 It was no easy task for the British in the Transvaal Territory between 1877 and 1881 even to 
begin to create a new colonial identity. As J.R. Seeley recognized in his famous series of lectures 
(published in 1883) lauding the “extension of the English race into other lands” and the 
unifying ties with the mother-land of “nationality, language and religion,” in South Africa there 
were “abatements which must be made to the general proposition that Greater Britain was 
homogeneous in nationality.”13 He was referring specifically to the situation of the English in 
the Cape Colony, where Dutch settlers were numerically and politically in the ascendant, but he 
could just as well have been describing the relationship between the British and Boers in the 
Transvaal on the eve of the First Anglo-Boer War.  
 In James Morris’s memorable phrase, the Transvaal was “the high retreat of everything most 
doggedly Boer.”14 British emigrants constituted a minority of white settlers who, as a racial 
group, were in a distinct minority in the Transvaal compared to the Africans. No proper census 
was ever taken of the Transvaal under British rule, but the general assumption was that the 
Dutch population was at least 36,000 (with estimates as high as 45,000), and that of the “Non-
Dutch” Europeans somewhere around 5,000, of whom two-thirds lived in the towns. The 
majority of these “Outsiders” were of British stock, though there were other “foreign 
adventurers” — Irish, Jews, Americans, Hollanders, Germans, Belgians, and Portuguese — 
whom the British liked to deprecate as “rarely men of high character and disinterested aims.”15 
Scots, noted for their clannishness, had concentrated in the little town of Heidelberg, where 
(noted the special commissioner of the Natal Mercury) they had made friends with Boers and 
English alike “no less by their geniality than by their independence of character.”16 Africans 
were estimated at between 700,000 and 800,000.17 This meant that while whites made up a mere 
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five per cent of the total population, the “Non-Dutch” constituted less than fourteen per cent of 
that tiny minority. 
 Nevertheless, this small “English” segment of the settler population remained 
disproportionately influential. In the towns, in the mining districts of Lydenburg and 
Zoutpansberg, in the inns along the roads, in the country trading stores, and wherever there 
was a field for enterprise, the British predominated commercially. Although the rural settler 
population was mainly Dutch, scattered over some 10,500 farms (large tracts of land, especially 
in the northern Transvaal, remained unsurveyed), even there individual British farmers were 
beginning to gain ground. In the fertile Lydenburg District in particular, which bordered on 
Swaziland and encompassed the Gold Fields around Pilgrims Rest that opened in 1871, farmers 
from the Cape Colony were buying up land, their farms distinguishable from those of the Boers 
by their “general air of neatness & cleanliness.”18 Commercial companies acquired hundreds of 
square miles of farms in the same district as investments.19 The Glasgow Company, for 
example, held 100 farms of 6,000 acres each.20 
 The influence of the British in the civil establishment was making itself increasingly felt, not 
only at the higher levels of the heads of department, judicial officials, landdrosts and 
commissioners, but also postal officials, field cornets, clerks, native commissioners, and 
schoolmasters. These officials divided themselves by nationality into 80 Dutch Afrikanders, 41 
English Afrikanders (natives of South Africa, mainly the Cape Colony), 68 Englishmen, 35 
Hollanders, 28 Germans, 1 Dane, and 1 Swede.21 The Hollanders, Germans, and other 
Europeans had entered the administration of the South African Republic [SAR] to aid in the 
executive work of the republic prior to British annexation, but the influx of English-speakers 
had ensued with it, providing the administration with a preponderance of officials upon which 
it believed it could rely, and alienating the existing officials who saw their previous political 
power being whittled away.22 In the Legislative Assembly, which came into operation in 1880, a 
considerable programme of legislation was enacted in its opening sessions despite its business 
being conducted in both Dutch and English, which doubled the work23 — and highlighted the 
deep differences between many of its elected and appointed members. 
 Inevitably, the bedrock of the British administration was the garrison of British troops with 
their headquarters in Pretoria. In November 1880, the 1,800 regulars under the command of 
Colonel William Bellairs were distributed across the Transvaal. The Pretoria garrison consisted 
of five companies and a mounted troop of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, a battery of 
artillery, and a detachment of Royal Engineers. Two further companies of the Fusiliers were 
deployed in Rustenburg. Two companies of the 94th Regiment were stationed in Lydenburg, 
with two more companies of the same regiment in Marabastad, a company at Standerton, and 
another company and a mounted troop in Wakkerstroom.24 Famed author Anthony Trollope, 
who journeyed to South Africa in 1877 to write a travel book for Chapman & Hall,25 commented 
that when entertained in the officers’ mess in Pretoria surrounded by officers in their uniforms, 
“it seemed as though a little block of England had been cut out and transported to the centre of 
South Africa.”26 
 These garrisons had considerable economic and social effects on the little towns where they 
were stationed — each soldier purchasing as much as a whole Boer family.27 These scattered 
History of Intellectual Culture, 2004 
 
 
5 
 
 
settlements normally ranged (with the exceptions of Pretoria and Potchefstroom, the two largest 
towns) from a hundred dwellings to less than ten. They always included a court house, church, 
and a central market place, for towns had begun under the Boers as administrative centres for 
the management of the land and entrepots for the sale of its produce, and as conveniently central 
situations where farmers could drive in to attend Nachtmaal [Communion], or send their 
children to the school (if the place had one). At first, there were no hotels because the idea of 
paying for food or entertainment was preposterous to the Boers.28 Only very recently had 
traders and speculators moved in, and shops and public hotels, inns, and private houses of 
accommodations sprung up to cater for such customers as British bureaucrats, soldiers, and (in 
the Gold Fields) prospectors.29 
 Travellers like Trollope found accommodation in establishments kept by Englishmen 
decent, clean, and up to their standards, not only in the larger towns like Potchefstroom, but 
even in tiny places like Klerksdorp, which had but half-a-dozen houses.30 Yet even Lydenburg, 
considered a lively place since the working of the Gold Fields began in 1867, and where 
property values were rising considerably, was described by Mrs. Mary Long, the wife of the 
Old Etonian Lt Walter Long of the garrison, as lacking “buildings of any consequence and 
unable to boast of a hospital, much less of a town-hall.”31 A few places like Pretoria, the seat of 
the administration, began to develop in tandem as commercial centres, and by 1880 were 
predominantly English-speaking. Yet Pretoria, the fastest growing town in the Transvaal, 
catering to British administrative, military, and commercial interests with its barracks, officers’ 
quarters, court-house, hospital, schools, government offices, banks and insurance companies, 
general stores, churches, and rows of new houses, had a civil population of only 2,250.32 
 The identity of the British settlers in the Transvaal at the time of the First Anglo-Boer War 
was consequently an ambivalent and vulnerable one. They were simultaneously the mainstay of 
the British administration and the economy, yet distrusted “Outsiders” among the Boer settler 
majority. In such precarious circumstances, the obvious alternative to fashioning an unlikely 
new colonial identity for themselves was to assert their Britishness and to cling to the tried and 
secure alternative of an exaggerated loyalty to the Crown and flag, for their future security and 
prosperity depended upon the maintenance of British rule. 
 Their insecurity induced the British in the Transvaal to participate in cultural and social 
activities which class differences and social habits would have constrained in Britain itself, and 
to submerge often antagonist British regional identities in a show of solidarity.33 In contrast to 
more successfully assimilated British expatriates in South America, for example, cultural 
aloofness was encouraged by the failure to transmit ideas, customs, fashions, and games to a 
suspicious and unreceptive Boer host society.34 Those hallmarks of British male and commercial 
solidarity in the colonies, Friendly Societies, were thoroughly established by 1880 in the more 
markedly British towns of the Transvaal, with four Masonic and five Good Templar Lodges 
distributed between Pretoria, Potchefstroom, and Rustenburg.35 Confessional affiliation was a 
significant identifier, and Protestantism (especially of the evangelical variety) a crucial marker 
of Britishness.36 The Boer population belonged overwhelmingly to the Dutch Reformed Church; 
the British and other foreigners belonged to Anglican, Roman Catholic, Wesleyan, and Lutheran 
churches with a combined membership in 1879 of 3,299, with 914 communicants. Significantly, 
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Anglicans formed the largest of these congregations, with a bishop in Pretoria and vicars at 
Potchefstroom, Rustenburg, Heidelberg, Standerton, Wakkerstroom, Marico, and Lydenburg.37 
Trollope noted that the resident Anglican clergyman in Pretoria was “a University man” who, 
now that the Transvaal was “an English colony,” would soon become the “‘clergyman of the 
place’,” for “such is the nature of Englishmen.”38 
 Two classes of schools in the Transvaal were Government and Aided (or private). 
Government were over 70 per cent Dutch Reformed, and received instruction in both Dutch and 
English. The British preferred that their children not be subjected to this regimen, and this 
accounted for the trebling between 1878 and 1879 of Aided Schools, where the children of non-
Boers could be educated in English and in their own religion.39  
 The Transvaal boasted no lunatic asylum, that ubiquitous symbol of settled civic 
responsibility, but the British possessed a vital organ of public opinion and free speech, an 
English newspaper. The Transvaal Argus was brought out three times a week in Pretoria, while 
De Volksstem appeared in English on Fridays and in Dutch on Tuesdays. Two further English-
medium newspapers, the Transvaal Advocate in Potchesfstroom and the Gold Fields Mercury of 
Pilgrim’s Rest, ceased publication during 1878.40 Public facilities for adult education, such as the 
public reading room in the newly laid out town of Zeerust (which went with an English church 
and school), attested to the desire — even in the remote Marico District — for the British to 
establish “the comforts of civilized life,” as they understood them.41  
 In terms of landscape and architecture, the British were determined to create an 
environment in which they felt at home. For Mary Long in Lydenberg, the square houses of the 
Boers were built “on the bare veldt,” with the “only thing approaching a garden” a vegetable 
plot nearly half a mile away. Her choice of dwelling was a “pretty little cottage” in the town, 
“buried” under the spreading branches of trees, and her deepest approbation was reserved for 
the “charming” English parsonage bordered by hedges and surrounded by “a perfect 
wilderness of roses.”42 General Sir Garnet Wolseley, Governor of the Transvaal in 1879–1880, 
compared the Lydenburg rose hedges to those which proliferated around the houses of the 
English in Pretoria, every street “like a grassy English lane.”43 Trollope reported exactly the 
same of Potchefstroom,44 testifying to the English talent for creating their preferred landscape 
wherever they settled. There was an exception, however: Standerton, with its stone and 
corrugated iron single-story houses, was unusual in its general absence of trees, fruit gardens, 
and hedges.45 
 Wolseley noted in his Journal the extent to which exotic British sports, entertainments, and 
social occasions were fostered. He mentioned playing lawn tennis, attending cricket matches in 
Pretoria with cocoanut matting spread between the wickets over the bare ground,46 and 
enjoying the regular concerts of the military band at Government House and the Town Square 
— which angered many Boers when they gathered to attend Nachtmaal the following day.47 A 
ball was given in his honour at the Masonic Hall, with supper laid out in a tent, and he held a 
levée and several receptions at Government House, where kilted Highland pipers “astonished 
the Afrikanders.” Wolseley did not enjoy these occasions — “an hour or so on a lively 
treadmill” would have been preferable — but saw them as an essential assertion of official 
British presence.48  
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 Nor did Wolseley find the colonial women of Pretoria in the least attractive. He privately 
sniggered at their social airs and “meretricious finery” when he knew that shortly before they 
had been busy with menial domestic chores, since African domestic servants — though much 
cheaper than servants in England — were untrained, migratory, and to English eyes often 
alarming in dress and habits.49 He genuinely pitied what “the woman brought up as a lady in 
England must undergo here,” where the social graces and aspirations of “home” collided with 
the rougher “hardness of their position.”50  
 Trollope, however, believed that if a family were prepared to conform to the more relaxed 
social customs of the colonial world, it could live comfortably on considerably less than in 
England. Pretoria, like any colonial city struggling into birth, struck the visitor with its 
untidiness — brandy bottles, sardine boxes, old boots, paper collars, and other rubbish 
everywhere among the small houses which produced an “air of meanness.” But on being 
entertained in a number of these lowly cottages, Trollope “found internal prettiness” and 
recorded that his English hosts had “managed to gather round them within a very small space 
all the comforts of civilized life.”51  
 C.E. Carrington has written that prominent among the pioneers of the nineteenth century 
were the traders, prospectors, and missionaries52 who blazed the trail for colonization.53 Such 
indeed were the British who first settled in the SAR before annexation, but those who followed 
during the period of British rule were predominantly artisans and working men (carpenters, 
blacksmiths, bricklayers, bakers, tailors, saddlers, and so on), who could demand good wages 
due to the shortage of skilled labour.54 Clerical workers found far better salaries in offices or 
stores than in government employ because the professional or mercantile communities 
increasingly dominated the Transvaal economy.55 Such people were not truly pioneers opening 
up a wilderness, but immigrants bringing modern skills, urban habits, and commercial practices 
to a society dominated by Boer farmers, still resolutely pre-industrial in outlook and preference. 
 This large influx of “English” capital and immigrants into the Transvaal, and their claims to 
own a third of the saleable property in the state, to pay more than half the land-tax, and to 
control almost all mercantile and commercial business,56 only exacerbated relations with the 
Boers. As Trollope pointed out, “Let an Englishman be where he may be about the surface of 
the globe, he always thinks himself superior to other men around him... He expects to be 
‘boss’.”57 This instinctive feeling of ascendancy naturally produced something akin to contempt 
for the rustic Boers, particularly among the more cosmopolitan town-dwellers who, secure in 
their belief in the protection of the British garrison, scoffed at the rising Boer discontent with 
British rule.58 Trollope, however, queried why the British taxpayer should be obliged to go on 
financing a large military force in the Transvaal to procure the safety of “the English who have 
settled themselves among the Boers?”59 
 The Transvaal British were confident that British military protection would continue. Sir 
Garnet Wolseley explicitly reiterated in his proclamations and public speeches that the Queen’s 
sovereignty would never be withdrawn. It might have been supposed that once Gladstone 
formed his second Liberal administration in April 1880, British policy towards the Transvaal 
would change. No supporter of the Tory confederation policy, nor even of the annexation of the 
Transvaal, Gladstone nevertheless reaffirmed in June 1880 his government’s intention not to 
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relinquish British rule.60 These unequivocal and repeated assurances encouraged many 
Englishmen to settle in the Transvaal, and persuaded those already there to invest fully in the 
country, confident they would not lose their property to the Boers. But it was Wolseley who 
saw most clearly the implications for the British settlers in the Transvaal should the British 
withdraw: 
 
[A]lmost all the trade and commerce of the country is in the hands of Englishmen 
who welcomed the advent of British Government with rejoicing, and who have 
incurred much ill-will by the open and patriotic avowal of their support of our 
policy...[T]he position of insecurity in which we should leave this loyal and 
important section of the community by exposing them to the certain retaliation of 
the Boers, would constitute, in my opinion, an insuperable obstacle to 
retrogression.61 
 
 Wolseley’s fears for the English community were to prove all too well-founded when the 
Boer rebellion finally broke out in December 1880. Sir Own Lanyon, the Administrator of the 
Transvaal, published Boer warnings that there could now be only two sorts of men in the 
Transvaal, “those who were for, and those who were against, the Boers, in their opposition to 
the Government,” and that “civil war was now being carried on.”62 But Lanyon had already 
recognized that it would be difficult in many cases for “people well-disposed towards the 
Government” to rally effectively to its support, since they were so “mixed up with and 
dependent on the Boers in trade and other pursuits.”63 
 Boer strategy, as became apparent once hostilities broke out with the Bronkhorstspruit 
engagement on 20 December 1880, was — as Colley explained to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Lord Kimberley — to be one of “surprising and attacking in detail our troops while 
spread in peace garrisons.”64 In these circumstances, the active role of loyal inhabitants could 
only be a limited one. Colley ordered all landdrosts and field cornets to call public meetings, 
prepare lists of all persons in their districts whose loyalty could be relied upon, and enroll 
loyalists as volunteers to defend their homes and government laagers. Volunteers were to help 
garrison troops with supplies and transport, and to act as scouts. While troop reinforcements 
were being concentrated at Newcastle, they were to hold out as best they could until relieved, 
but were not to resist if the odds against them seemed irresistible.65 
 In Pretoria, Potchefstroom, Standerton, and Wakkerstroom, loyalist civilians took refuge 
from besieging Boers with the British garrisons in their forts, or behind hastily-erected defences, 
and the men duly helped the troops in their defence, organizing themselves into volunteer 
units. Elsewhere, in Rustenburg, Lydenburg, and Marabastad, where forts were rudimentary 
and garrisons small, the civilians prudently remained neutral. In the towns under siege, the 
defenders saw incessant military action and suffered considerable privations. The Boers 
captured none of these defended positions, but Colley’s failure to break through from Natal 
with a relieving force, and his defeat and death on Majuba on 27 February 1881 meant the 
beleaguered towns could but hang on until another attempt at relief was made, or hostilities 
brought to an end through negotiation.66 
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 On 6 March 1881, Colley’s successor, Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood, signed an armistice 
with the Boer leaders. This was extended to permit further negotiations, and on 21 March, 
Wood acknowledged the right of the Transvaal people to complete independence subject to 
British suzerain rights. The Boers suggested that a Royal Commission should work out the 
details.67 After prolonged bargaining, a Convention was agreed upon and signed on 3 August 
1881.68 The Republican flag was hoisted at Pretoria on 8 August 1881 as the transfer of power 
ceremonially took place. 
 The Convention was a complex document, and the issue of suzerainty would bedevil future 
British-Boer relations. But the prime objective of Gladstone and his Colonial Secretary Lord 
Kimberley had been achieved, namely, the reassurance of the South African Dutch. At the very 
outset of the conflict, Colley had warned Kimberley that his “greatest anxiety” was that “the 
rising should turn into a war between the two white races in South Africa” because “there was 
undoubtedly strong sympathy with the Boers throughout the Dutch population” of the sub-
continent.69 During the course of the war, increasingly strong public reaction among the Dutch 
seemed to bear out Colley’s anxieties. Kimberley came increasingly to fear a pan-Afrikaner 
uprising throughout southern Africa which might be the signal for a general African revolt, and 
ultimately create another version of the intractable Irish problem bedevilling the Liberal 
administration. By placating the Transvaal Boers and conciliating the Cape and Free State 
Dutch, the Convention defused the grim possibility of a united Afrikaner front challenging 
British dominance in South Africa. It also heralded a new approach to solving the South African 
problem. The Tory policy of formal confederation was to be replaced with the idea of informal 
paramountcy, the making of friends and the winning of influence — which meant courting the 
Boers and creating stronger and more amiable ties for the future. What this amounted to in 
practical terms was that English colonists, who formed the settler minority, were to be sacrificed 
on the altar of improved Anglo-Boer relations.70  
 When Kimberley wrote on 31 March 1881 to Sir Hercules Robinson, appointing him, Sir 
Evelyn Wood, and Sir H. de Villiers to be the Royal Commissioners for the settlement of the 
Transvaal, he declared that “Her Majesty’s Government are bound to take care that those who 
have been faithful to the British cause during the late war shall not suffer any detriment in 
consequence of their loyalty.” It was to be the Commissioners’ duty to lay down conditions 
securing for loyalists “full liberty to reside in the country, with enjoyment of all civil rights and 
protection for their persons and property.”71 
 Such noble sentiments did nothing to dissuade the Transvaal English from their conclusion 
that Gladstone had betrayed them. On 7 April, representatives of the Central Committee of the 
Loyal Inhabitants of the Transvaal, which had been formed in Pretoria on 29 March with 
branches in Wakkerstroom, Newcastle, and elsewhere to coordinate the protests of loyal 
subjects across South Africa,72 approached General Wood in Heidelberg, requesting him to 
forward their petition to the Home Government. The petition, signed by the committee’s 
chairman, C.K. White (a former member of the Transvaal Legislative Assembly), and its 
secretary, Martin J. Farrell (a surveyor engaged in working on the proposed Delagoa Railway), 
warned Gladstone that the repeated promises of the Imperial Government indicating that the 
Transvaal would ever remain British had induced large investments in land and property 
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which were now jeopardized. “The banks are leaving, capitalists are endeavouring to withdraw, 
and all enterprise...is paralysed.” Valuable property had become unsaleable and “extremely 
depreciated in value.” Beyond this, active collaboration with the British forces during the war 
had placed the loyalists in a position where it would be unsafe to remain in the Transvaal under 
Boer rule. As it was, since the armistice, many had suffered “in person and in property” from 
the Boers. The petitioners declared themselves “cruelly deceived by the mother country,” and 
claimed the right “for the fullest material compensation” from the Imperial Government for 
their losses.73 
 The Central Committee of the Loyal Inhabitants also printed a Humble Petition to the 
House of Commons, expanding on the points made in the letter to Gladstone. This reported that 
many working-class Englishmen in the Transvaal (150 from Pretoria alone, during a single week 
of April) had already left the country with their families for Natal and the Diamond Fields, 
because there was no employment on account of the “universal stagnation.”74 A deputation 
under White, with funds raised by public subscription, prepared to leave for England on 10 
May to present the petition to the Commons.75 Not to be outdone by the Loyal Inhabitants, on 4 
May the Transvaal Refugee Committee also petitioned Kimberley. In their appeal, James 
Murray and 34 others repeated the point that, believing that the annexation of the Transvaal to 
be irrevocable, much capital had been invested, “including the introduction of machinery.” 
Much of this investment would be lost under restored Boer rule, “as loyal subjects of England 
cannot submit to Boer rule, and will have no option but to renounce their allegiance to England 
or abandon their property.”76 
 The prime concern among the English in the Transvaal seemingly was not so much their 
imperilled allegiance to the Crown, nor even the plight of the Africans abandoned to harsh 
republican rule — this latter a ploy adopted by the petitioners to prick the conscience of a 
Liberal administration.77 Rather, it was material loss. Compensation was problematical because 
the great bulk of the loss was indirect, a matter (as Haggard recognized) of the imponderable 
depreciation of the value of property under renewed Boer rule.78 Not that direct losses had not 
been damaging enough. During the war, English farmers and townspeople (especially 
storekeepers) had abandoned their property to take refuge with the British garrisons, or to trek 
for safety out of the Transvaal altogether, whereupon it was looted or commandeered.79 When 
these depredations did not cease with the armistice, many more of the English packed up what 
they could carry, and left.80 Haggard saw them pouring through Newcastle in their hundreds: 
“There were people of all classes, officials, gentlefolk, work-people, and loyal Boers, but they 
had a connecting link; they had all been loyal, and they were all ruined.”81 
 When the Royal Commissioners met on 29 April 1881 at Newcastle in northern Natal to 
discuss the settlement of the Transvaal, it took evidence from various interested parties. Very 
much to the fore were the organized groups of loyalist petitioners, who made sure that the 
grievances of the despoiled Transvaal British were given considerable prominence. On 16 May 
1881, a Deputation for the Protection of the Loyals of the Transvaal (members of the Committee 
of the Loyal Inhabitants of the Transvaal) laid a bundle of affidavits before the Commission 
detailing their sufferings at Boer hands.82 John Nixon followed up his deputation’s presentation 
to the Commission on 20 May with a long minute arguing compensation for both direct and 
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indirect claims. He concluded by loyally assuring the Commissioners that many of the 
claimants “would willingly sacrifice every penny of compensation, provided they could see 
British rule still maintained in the country.”83 Their long-term prospects might conceivably have 
been more secure under the Crown, though whether most claimants were really willing to give 
up the short-term prospect of compensation cannot be known. In any case the alternative was 
not feasible; the Commission was sitting with explicit instruction to end British rule in the 
Transvaal. 
 The Loyal Inhabitants Committee continued to press the commissioners. On 27 and 28 May 
1881, they had two more long meetings, and presented another sheaf of affidavits.84 Petitions 
and affidavits continued to flood to the Commissioners from a variety of sources: from 
Transvaal émigrés, investors, and sympathizers in the Cape mining town of Kimberley, 
organized as the Transvaal Sufferers’ Protection Association;85 from the Cape Commercial Bank 
and the Standard Bank;86 and from numbers of other individuals and loosely-organized groups 
in Pretoria, Cape Town, and elsewhere.87 Nor did protests against the “humiliation and shame” 
of the Transvaal peace end with genteel petitions and resolutions by orderly — if excited — 
public meetings in the English-speaking Cape Colony towns of Cape Town and King William’s 
Town on 8 April, Port Elizabeth on 12 April, and East London on 14 April.88 Popular anger 
against Gladstone and his administration took on the time-hallowed form of the “authorised 
transgression” of carnivalesque rites, expressed in this case as an immediately recognizable 
inversion of the patriotic songs, representations of public personalities, and nationalistic flag 
waving of the distinctive British music hall culture of the time.89 
 On 26 March, a flag-staff was set up in the middle of the Market Square, flying the British 
Ensign reversed with the Transvaal Vierkleur flag above it. The Saturday market crowd 
reportedly relished the symbolism, and when the insulted Ensign was ripped down by an 
indignant “Jingo,” the anti-government mob dragged it through the mud and trod it under 
foot.90 Another even more satisfying act of symbolism was already establishing the pattern of 
protest, one that projected familiar and easily recognizable cultural resonances that went back 
to the seventeenth century: the ritual burning in a bonfire each fifth of November of the effigy of 
Guy Fawkes, the arch-traitor and foe of British liberty and established religion who in 1605 
plotted to blow up Parliament. 
 On 3 April, a large cartoon of the British lion being led blindfolded by Gladstone was 
paraded on a cart around Cape Town accompanied by a loud band. That evening a crowd 
estimated to be nearly 6,000 strong gathered on the Grand Parade to burn Gladstone’s effigy in 
a huge bonfire.91 This satisfying immolation was emulated in Newcastle on 28 March by the 
loyal townspeople and refugees (with the prudent exception of a few merchants in the “Boer 
trade”). In the Market Square, the Union Jack, draped in mourning, was hoisted at half-mast. 
An effigy of Gladstone was tried and found guilty of high treason, and then hanged and burnt 
by the tumultuous crowd.92 In Kimberley, Gladstone’s effigy met a similar fate on the Market 
Square, to the jeers of a large crowd and the appropriate accompanying strains of the “Dead 
March” from Saul and raucous Jingo songs. The serious intent of the carnival was emphasized 
by newspapers at pains to report the crowd as “well conducted” and not out simply for a 
“lark.”93  
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 Nor was this the end of the public burnings. In Wakkerstroom, where loyalists had suffered 
severely from Boer depredations, Gladstone’s effigy was burned on 5 April “in the presence of 
the whole town.”94 On Saturday 9 April, in Pietermaritzburg, a well-advertised demonstration 
paraded another effigy of Gladstone — this time in full evening-dress with a rope around his 
neck —through the streets on a funeral car accompanied by a coffin labelled “Liberal Ministry” 
and an inverted Ensign with a mourning fringe. It was then hanged and burnt on the Market 
Square, to the sound of many speeches.95 The last of this rash of public burnings, whose 
implications Gladstone could not have failed to miss, took place in Pretoria on 17 April.96  
 None of these protests nor wide-ranging pleas for comprehensive restitution or 
compensation would have any effect if the Liberal government refused to entertain them. 
Queen Victoria might fret that “the interests of our loyal friends” in the Transvaal were being 
sacrificed “for the sake of a few discontented Boers,”97 but Gladstone (even though already 
burnt six times in effigy) was not to be deflected. It is true that the skilful petition from the 
Loyal Inhabitants of the Transvaal, dispatched in April, caused Gladstone the maximum of 
embarrassment. Nevertheless, with Kimberley’s help, he concocted what he considered a fitting 
response. Gladstone’s letter of 1 June to White and Farrell left no doubt as to where the 
Transvaal British stood. After glibly justifying his termination of the war, the abandonment of 
the South African confederation policy, and the retrocession of the Transvaal, Gladstone turned 
to the situation of the English settlers. He “willingly and thankfully” acknowledged their “loyal 
co-operation,” and assured them that in the settlement being hammered out, care would be 
taken to secure them “the full enjoyment of their property and of all civil rights.” The sting, 
however, was in the tail. Gladstone declared that whilst his government  
 
cannot recognise any general claim for compensation in respect of depreciation 
of property arising from the change of policy involved in the new arrangement, 
the question of compensation to either side for acts committed during the late 
troubles, not justified buy the necessities of war, has been remitted to the 
Commission.98 
 
This was certainly not what Loyal Inhabitants wanted to hear. From that moment, they knew 
Gladstone had resolved to throw them over. But before they could decide on further action, 
they had to learn what the Royal Commission would decide. 
 The Commissioners certainly had all the evidence before them necessary to make a ruling 
over compensation, beside the known wishes of the British government. Considerable 
discussion ensued; Lord Kimberley was consulted and his approval sought, as was that of the 
Boer leaders. In their official Report to the Queen (Wood submitted a dissenting report), 
Robinson and de Villiers devoted paragraphs 119 to 133 to the question of “compensation for 
losses through war,” and paragraph 149 to “protection of trade and interest of loyals.”99 Their 
decisions were incorporated into the Convention signed in Pretoria with the Boer 
representatives on 3 August 1881. Very much in line with Gladstone’s letter of 1 June, Articles 
6–9 stipulated that compensation was to be paid, as appropriate, by either the Transvaal or 
British government for all claims approved by a sub-commission for loss or damage caused by 
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“(a) commandeering, seizure, confiscation, or destruction of property, or damage done to 
property; (b) violence done or threats used by persons in arms.” Losses caused by “enforced 
abandonment” were also to be allowed. However, it was firmly laid down that “[n]o claims for 
indirect losses...will be entertained,”100 dashing many loyalists’ hopes. Nevertheless, Article 12 
met one of the loyalists’ greatest concerns by stipulating that they would “suffer no 
molestation” on account of supporting the British forces, and that “all such persons will have 
full liberty to reside in the country, with enjoyment of all civil rights, and protection for their 
persons and property.”101 Furthermore, Articles 16, 26, 27, 30, and 31 guaranteed their freedom 
of religion, movement, and commercial activity, residential and property rights, and protection 
by the courts. Article 28 made all persons who came to live in the Transvaal after British 
annexation exempt from compulsory military service in the Boer state, thus avoiding any 
conflict of loyalties. 
 At first glance, it would appear that the Transvaal English should have had little to 
complain about regarding the terms of the convention. Haggard, however, put his finger on two 
main items of loyalist discontent which it did not effectively address. The loyalists(and he) 
believed that “the great bulk of losses sustained were of an indirect nature,” and that claims for 
compensation for these “were passed by unheeded.” While many of the Transvaal British 
believed that, the paper guarantees notwithstanding, a Transvaal no longer under British rule 
was “a country that could no longer be their home.”102 
 As early as 28 May, Martin Farrell, secretary to the Loyal Inhabitants of the Transvaal, had 
written to the Royal Commission that his committee had succeeded thus far in exerting its 
influence “to prevent disturbance consequent on the dissatisfaction prevailing from the action 
of the Imperial Government.” Perhaps Farrell did not consider the March and April burnings of 
Gladstone in effigy a “disturbance.” He did add that unless the Commission heeded his 
requests for proper compensation and protection under Boer rule, “serious and grave breaches 
of law and order must ensue for which the Committee cannot hold themselves responsible.”103  
 On August 2, when it was learned that the Convention was to be signed in Pretoria the 
following day in the very same room in which, four years before, Sir Theophilus Shepstone had 
signed the Annexation Proclamation, the threatened disturbances broke out. They were neither 
serious nor unruly, as Farrell had predicted, but a carefully orchestrated symbolic pantomime 
in the form of a ceremonious burial of the Union Jack. The flag was followed to its grave by a 
crowd of about 2,000 loyalists. On its coffin was written: “In loving memory of the British flag 
in the Transvaal, who departed this life on the 2nd August, 1881, in his fifth year. ‘In other 
climes none knew thee but to love thee’. Resurgam."104 
 An eloquent oration was delivered, in which it was lamented that “the flag we loved is 
dead” and had come to an untimely end “in the midst of her glory by an insidious blow from 
the hands of her most trusted advisors.”105 This was indeed an act of potent meaning, the 
ceremonial immolation of the loyalists’ hitherto cherished and vaunted symbol of allegiance as 
British citizens, degraded by Gladstone’s betrayal, but buried in the hope of resurrection (and 
financial compensation) under another administration. 
 This act of burial also represented closure. Just before leaving Pretoria on 5 August, Wood, 
in his final days as Administrator of the Transvaal, received an address from 60 English 
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inhabitants of the town. They declared themselves concerned at the animosity which the Boers 
held toward loyalists. Furthermore, they expressed a fear that, in the conceivable case of a war 
between the Transvaal and Britain, loyalists who had settled in the Transvaal before 1877 (and 
who were, in terms of Article 28 of the Convention, not exempt from military service) would be 
placed in the impossible position of having to fight against Britain. The petitioners “most 
solemnly” protested against any loyal British subjects “being handed over to the mercy of the 
Boers.” Their fears were real, but the Convention was signed and the case closed, and Wood 
sent them a dusty reply firmly telling them so.106 The Transvaal loyalists were left with no 
choice but to buckle down under Boer rule, or leave the country. 
 Considered dispassionately, the Transvaal British emerged relatively unscathed from the 
Transvaal War of 1880–1. Those who stayed suffered no ethnic cleansing or any other 
meaningful form of persecution; their direct material losses were recompensed to the tune of 
₤110,000, defrayed by the Imperial Government when the Boers defaulted from paying their 
share.107 Trade losses had not been as great as at first claimed; many of those who had “kept 
quiet and held their tongues” during the war had “done a good business.”108 As for indirect 
losses, any of the British who remained in the Transvaal, or continued to invest in the country, 
were rewarded tenfold when the discovery in 1886 of gold in huge paying quantities on the 
Witwatersrand heralded boom economic conditions.  
 Where the Transvaal British considered themselves most hurt was in their very sense of 
“Englishness” — their ingrained belief that, as loyal subjects, they should have been able to rely 
absolutely on the protection of the Crown, both politically and economically. After all, they 
were a vulnerable (if economically potent) minority in the small Transvaal settler community, 
still “Outlanders” who had not had time to securely impose cultural and political dominance on 
the Transvaal Territory. The perceived betrayal by Gladstone’s administration rankled 
especially, as did the conviction that they had been cravenly and unnecessarily abandoned to 
the humiliation and inconvenience of rule by the despised and retrograde Boers; and that, 
perhaps even more crucially for some, they had not been adequately compensated for their 
material losses, both current and potential. Their repeated burning of Gladstone’s effigy 
signalled disgust with the politician and his administration; but, more profoundly, their 
burying of the Union Jack, the very symbol of their British identity, expressed their outraged 
sense of betrayal and alienation. Haggard captured these sentiments with deep, personal 
feeling: 
 
Such an act of treachery to those to whom we were bound with double chains — 
by the strong ties of a common citizenship, and by those claims to England’s 
protection from violence and wrong which have hitherto been wont to command 
it, even where there was not duty to fulfil, and not authority to vindicate — 
stands, I believe, without parallel in our records, and marks a new departure in 
our history.109 
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